



Regulatory Developments and Risk Challenges Impacting Financial Market Infrastructures

29 March 2012



### **Agenda**

- Risk Challenges for FMIs with emphasis on CSDs
  - Financial Risk
  - Liquidity Risk
  - Counterparty Risk
  - Asset Safety Risk
  - Operational Risk
  - Governance and Transparency Risk
- Amendments to Thomas Murray Methodology
- Next Steps





### **Risk Overview**

Financial Risk Liquidity Risk

Counterparty Risk

Asset Safety Risk

Operational Risk

Governance and Transparency
Risk



#### **Financial Risk**

## Challenge

 FMIs must increase their capital and liquid reserves to meet new standards and regulatory requirements.

## Example

- Egypt's political turmoil in 2011:
- The market was closed for almost two months

- CPSS IOSCO Principal 15: General Business Risk
- "An FMI Should identify, monitor and manage its general business risk and hold sufficiently liquid assets funded by equity to cover potential losses so it can continue providing services as a going concern".



- To determine what level of capital is adequate for the CSD
- To finance the capital increase in a way that it is not a deterrent to the market / investors (e.g. via significant price increases)
- Revenue diversification Commercial vs utility services
- To re-assess the CSD's financial and dividend policy to maintain sufficient liquid reserves
- Capital should be stress-tested vs potential losses and call on resources
- Changes to the investment policies to manage liquid reserves where is safe and profitable to maintain the reserves?
- How to control costs as capital requirements will be correlated with monthly expenses?





### How to invest and manage the additional liquid reserves?





### **Liquidity Risk**

## Challenge

High quality collateral is in short supply.

### Example

- 2008 credit crisis started the liquidity squeeze which still persists.
- The Eurosystem has removed Greek sovereign debt as eligible collateral.

- CPSS IOSCO Principal 5: Collateral
- "An FMI that requires collateral to manage its or its participants' credit risk should accept collateral with low credit, liquidity, market risk".



- How to maintain sufficient liquidity in the system while applying conservative haircuts?
- How to calculate haircuts for different types of securities?
- Should CSDs provide for centralised collateral management schemes?
- How often should collateral be calculated? Can the system support collateral calculation on a mark-tomarket basis?
- Is the risk model taking into account intra-day volatility in asset prices?





### How to maintain sufficient liquidity in the market?







### **Counterparty Risk**

## Challenge

Default and fails management procedures for cash OTC trades

## Example

 On-exchange trades are well managed but OTC trades need to be under control

- CPSS IOSCO Principal 13: Participant-default rules and procedures
- "An FMI should have effective and clearly defined rules and procedures to manage a participant default that ensure that the FMI can take timely action to contain losses and liq pressures".



- Regulation has been concentrated around OTC derivatives (e.g Dodd-Frank Act and EMIR), could OTC cash markets be next?
- Very few CSDs currently regulate OTC trades
- Most CCPs cover on-exchange trades while OTC mostly optional
- Most CSDs do not have the power to regulate the OTC market
- Should the fails and default management procedures be similar to the on-exchange market?
- What would be the best entity to manage these?
- Additional guarantees for OTC trades could squeeze liquidity in other markets





### How to mitigate market risk in OTC trades?







### **Asset Safety Risk**

## Challenge

Maintain segregation of participants' assets

### Example

 Lehman, Madoff and MF Global have raised the question of asset safety to the fore.

- CPSS IOSCO Principal 16: Custody and Investment Risk
- "An FMI should safeguard its assets and minimise the risk of loss or delay in access to those assets, including assets posted by its participants".



- Indirect vs Direct Holding Models how to convert an existing account structure?
- Can the CSD offer alternatives to investors looking to have a fully segregated account?
- Can foreign investors be direct participants of the CSD or be 'sponsored' participants?
- Can foreign investors manage their accounts remotely?
- Can the CSD provide sufficient information to regulators in respect of participants' holdings?
- How to protect participants' assets in the event of another participant going bankrupt in the same pooled account?





## How to protect investors against other participants' bankruptcies?







### **Operational Risk**

## Challenge

• To provide continuity of systems and services in any circumstance.

## Example

 The 2010 earthquake in Chile proved that an overseas back-up centre might be necessary in extreme circumstances.

- CPSS IOSCO Principal 17: Operational Risk
- "An FMI should identify all possible sources of operational risk, both internal and external, and minimise their impact through the deployment of appropriate systems, controls and procedures".



- Identify potential threats and sources of risk for the CSD different CSDs are exposed to different types of risks depending on location, market conditions, etc.
- How to find a solution that can be funded by the CSD and provides effective recoverability/ continuity of operations?
- Distance vs latency can back-up centre's further away provide real-time data mirroring? How much latency is acceptable?
- What kind of tests are required to ensure that the CSD will remain operational? How to involve all participants (live vs simulated tests)?

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### How to find the right balance between risk, cost and effort?







### **Governance and Transparency Risk**

## Challenge

 How can CSDs have a balanced Board that works on behalf of the market and provides enough corporate and market data.

### Example

Additional levels of transparency demanded for vertical silos

- CPSS IOSCO Principal 2: Governance
- "An FMI should have governance arrangements that are clear and transparent, promote the safety and efficiency of the FMI, and promote the efficiency of the broader financial system".



- The Board should have the right balance of shareholders, participants, qualified independent directors, etc.
- Transparency in fee policy and other decisions are crucial since CSDs are natural monopolies
- Changes and developments should be consulted with participants through committees
- The Board should work in favour of the CSD and the market
- CSDs should have adequate systems in place to provide sufficient market information
- CSDs should provide sufficient corporate information to allow investors to verify the financial strength and proficiency of risk controls of the CSD.





### Do all Board members have a common interest?





### **Amendments to Thomas Murray Methodology**

- New methodology
  - A more numerical approach
  - Incorporation of some of the recommendations of CPSS IOSCO and other new regulations for CSDs e infrastructure entities
- Two new risks will be added to the CSD risk assessments
  - Asset Safety Risk
  - Governance and Transparency Risk
- New risk assessments on CCPs will be developed in 2012





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### **Next Steps**



## An avalanche of regulations



## **Thank You**



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